Vasco da Gama Yacht Rally
2009-2010 Third and Fourth Edition
ABOUT PIRACY

Update : thursday 22 november, 2011 :

Convoys in the Indian Ocean in 2012

Everybody with plans to sail in 2012 from Thailand/Malaysia to Salah should read the advise of Tom Sampson and publiced on the website Noonsite this month. As leader of the Vasco da Gama Rallies I agree with this.
Despite several organizers of convoys in the past have stopped with their activities, the TTT convoy organized by Rene and Edit Tiemessen from the yacht Alondra are planning to organize a new convoy.

This is stupid, dangerous and criminal, because there is not a safe route! Participating yachts have to come on their own to Salalah in Oman through the most dangerous route in the World.

According to their website, the actual route starts in Salalah, where they will join one of the participating yachts to lead the convoy to Massawa in Eritrea. The TTT boats will also sail from the Maledives up North and then West heading for Salalah. This is a very dangerous route! Many yachts did this in 2011 and TTT Rally says no one has encountered problems doing so. But this is not correct! There was the hijack of the yacht QUEST and of the ING. Therefore 4 sailors died and 7 sailors where released after 7 months in captivy and a paid ransom of million dollars. Next to this some weeks ago a French catamaran was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden and the skipper murdered.


The organizers off the TTT Rally would like to come in january 2012 to Puketh for a meeting, but I think only to collect your money and wish you a good trip to Oman, if you are not so lucky you loose not only this money but perhaps your life or loose a long time your freedom. Believe me captured in Somalia is not funny.

Lo Brust, sy Mistral

6th Vasco da Gama Rally

Due to the affected developments of the piracy in the Indian Ocean, North of the Maldives till Oman en Yemen there is no more a safe route to the Red Sea.

For this reason there will be no Vasco da Gama rallies organized in 2011 and 2012 from the Med to India and in reversed direction. 

There are plans to organize a VdGR Red Sea Winter Rally in 2012 from Turkey as far as Eritrea and back to the Med in spring 2013.

Update : thursday 25 november, 2010 :

THE South African yacht skipper whose crew were kidnapped by Somali pirates last week was willing to “go down” with his vessel.

In a blow by blow account of the traumatic hijacking off the Tanzanian coast on October 26, Peter Eldridge, 61, yesterday explained that he was prepared to sink his yacht, SY Choizil, if the pirates
made it their “mother ship” to rob other vessels.

“I had made peace that ... if they were going to go ahead with their plan to make it their mother ship, I was prepared to sink with my yacht and the pirates,” he said.

Eldridge refused to leave his yacht when the pirates finally took his crew, Durban couple Bruno Prelizzari and Deborah Calitz, hostage on November 7.

Prelizzari and Calitz are still in the hands of their captors.

Eldridge, an experienced yachtsman, had lived on his yacht on the coast of Dar-es- Salaam for several years. “I decided to sail to Richards Bay in November because it was a good time to sail. I approached Bruno and Debbie to be my crew and they agreed because this would allow them to visit their families back home,” Eldridge said at the Zululand Yacht Club yesterday.

He said the issue of piracy was fully discussed in Dar-es-Salaam before they set sail in October.

“We believed that in the likely event of being attacked, we would be robbed and then the pirates would leave us,” he said.

On October 26, 160km from the Tanzanian coast, two motorboats pulled up on either side of the yacht.

He was quickly able to send out a mayday signal. Twelve pirates, armed with AK47 guns and RPG rockets, boarded the yacht. “Communication was poor but they demanded the satellite radio and PETER ELDRIDGE any cellphones we had. They disconnected the fixed radio and removed it.” The three were held at gunpoint while the vessel was searched.

“All the presents that Bruno and Debbie had bought for family back home and their money were found. When they came back we repeatedly told them we didn’t have any money and that we were South African,” he said.

The pirates stayed on the yacht while a mother ship carrying drums of fuel delivered food and tea to them. On November 7, the pirates spotted a French warship on the horizon. “There were two boats. One was from Amsterdam. Their helicopters were hovering overhead.

“The pirates then began firing at the warship with their AK47s and launched rockets.” He was told to contact the French vessel.

Eldridge was able to inform them over the radio that there were eight pirates on board.

“Afterwards, the pirates made us sit on the side of the yacht, facing the warship. They had guns to our heads,” he said.

The pirates motored the yacht until the motor seized and it ran aground on the Somali coast.

The couple were forced ashore but Eldridge refused to leave. “One of the pirates came back,” he said. “He ripped the microphone from the radio and started beating me. I refused to go. I lodged myself so he couldn’t pull me out. He then discharged his weapon. I was uninjured. He then left.”

Eldridge made contact with the warship again and was rescued.

 

Update : monday 15 november, 2010 :

Our friends and rally members Paul and Rachel Chandler from yacht Lynn Rival have been released from the Somalian pirates this week. They have been captured for more as one year in Somalia. The Vasco Da Gama Rally organisation is very happy that they are safe now and on their way back to home in the UK. We wish them all the best for the future.

 

Update : Read more about the ISAF Meeting in the UK, Oct 2010:

INTERNATIONAL SAILING FEDERATION  

Minutes of a meeting held at MSCHOA Northwood on Tuesday 19th October 2010 to review anti-piracy measures in the Gulf of Aden in particular with regard to the passage of cruising yachts.

MSCHOA

Simon Church MNLO2

Captain Robert Ellesmore MNLO,

L/Cdr Steve Anderson Asst to Chief of Staff MSCHOA

L/Cdr Albrechtsen Royal Danish Navy

and naval staff of EUNAVFOR and NATO naval personnel.

ISAF

Alan Green                    Chairman IR Commission

Stuart Carruthers           Chairman-elect, IR Commission

Peter Seymour               Blue Water Rallies

Ian Tew                        Royal Cruising Club

Jeremy Wyatt                World Cruising (rally organizers and proprietors of cruising website Noonsite)

Ted Osborn                    Cruising Association

Keith Williams                Yacht Panularis

Dick Moore                   Ocean Cruising Club

Jack Lloyd                    Volvo Ocean Race

  1. On behalf of MSCHOA Simon Church welcomed attendees.

 

  1. Presentations were given by MSCHOA followed by Qs and As which included the agenda items, all summarized as follows:

 

  1. The pirates were organized in criminal gangs whose object was to make money. Those at sea had an image of themselves as “Jin al Bar” – Demons of the Seas.  Mostly young without prospect they chewed a locally-made drug “Khat” which kept them in a constantly heightened state and made their actions unpredictable. 

 

  1. The pirates typically go to sea in a long narrow roughly built open GRP boat of 30 to 40 ft with an inboard diesel (the “mother ship” often white in colour), towing two smaller open GRP boats (often blue-painted) with high-powered outboards giving a speed of 25 knots.  All the boats are known generically as “skiffs”. With drums of fuel on board a mother ship could achieve a range of 1,000 miles and may be at sea for 30 days.  Voyage ‘planning’ such as it is, does not appear to include using fuel and supplies carried in the skiffs to return to the Somali coast – this may depend on their capturing a ship.  Not infrequently a pirate vessel would outrun its fuel supply and the crew would perish from lack of food and water.  That is all part of the “Jin Al Bar” culture.  On finding a ship they would fire AK47s or RPGs and attempt to board using a hooked ladder.  If a ship was not found by the end of their deployment the pirates were liable to attack anything to provide a means of getting back to Somalia.   Although attacks were usually made in daylight, a pirate crew that has exhausted its supplies and is at the end of its tether may resort to an attack at any time which could include a moment when the watchkeeping on a yacht was at a low ebb, say 0100.   Once pirates have boarded, the rules of engagement of the naval forces prevent further action.

 

  1. Similar gangs operate people-smuggling in large open boats from the north coast of Somalia towards Yemen.  Estimates of migrants reaching Yemen were 29,000 in 2007 increasing to 78,400 in 2010. On a number of occasions smugglers have turned back when still offshore and dumped their passengers into the sea with few survivors.  People-smugglers and pirates may well be the same individuals, showing a ruthless disregard for humanity.

 

  1. Pirates also hi-jacked dhows, craft in widespread use in the region for fishing and general commerce and used these craft as mother ships.

 

  1. Generally the piracy operation is weather-dependent as the skiffs cannot maintain speed in large seas.  Their optimum windows during the year were governed by the monsoons.  A few large offshore fishing vessels have been pirated to act as mother ships allowing a much wider operating window. These now operated primarily in the Indian Ocean.

 

  1. The NE Monsoon is fully developed in January each year and the SW Monsoon in July.   During these months, and up to a month either side, the weather in the NW Indian Ocean is generally too strong for the small boats used by the pirates and their activity tends to be reduced or to concentrate towards the west of the Gulf of Aden.   Pirates are very active during the transition periods between monsoons when most yachts also prefer to sail in the area.

 

  1. Naval patrols were tasked to ‘deter and disrupt’ pirate activity and concentrated on the IRTC.  There were now as many as 28 naval ships but the task remained comparatively enormous.  Was the naval effort winning?  Successes were being achieved and the naval forces were gradually learning more about the pirates’ operations.

 

  1. The concentration of naval effort in the GoA has led to increasing numbers of pirates seeking targets further afield.

 

  1. How many yachts pirated?  Several had been attacked in recent years though none was recorded during the last 12 months.  Naval opinion was that as long as yachts transit the area there will be more captures.  There was particular concern for the welfare of captured children who could be treated very badly.

 

  1. French naval forces had used armed interventions in the cases of two yachts.  In the first with success but in the second (Thanit) the yacht skipper was accidentally killed.  Armed intervention was not expected to be undertaken in future.

 

  1. Did most yachts under-estimate the risk of a GoA passage?  In the view of the naval authorities, yes.

 

  1. Would a passage through the GoA by yachts in a large group (convoy) give a better chance of protection?  In the view of the naval authorities, no but it was appreciated that psychological advantage could be perceived by those in such groups and that was not without value. Dick Moore had experience in 2007 of forming a convoy of 5 boats on an ad hoc basis, carefully choosing his companion vessels.  Close station keeping was difficult particularly over the 5-day transit period.  In Tom Sampson’s convoy there were sub-groups or “flights” of 6 vessels which were briefed to close up if danger threatened.  However it was estimated that an attack may only become evident some 2 ½ minutes before the pirates were alongside and it took far longer than that for boats to “close up”.

 

  1. In the Blue Water Rally a yacht convoy manoeuvre in the face of attack was to have the sub-group of 5 or 6 immediately close up and face the attacker (having been briefed and trained in advance).  This had been successfully used on one occasion.

 

  1. Do the pirates have specific targets?  In some cases, yes.  Others simply go to places where the coalition warships are not present.

 

  1. Would it help if a yacht carried armament, say a shotgun?  In the naval view, no.  There has been much debate on the wisdom of carrying arms in merchant ships.  The majority view is not to do so on the basis that it would lead to an escalation of violence.  Some escalation has already been seen where pirates now make their first move on a target whilst actually firing weapons.  At Bab el Mandeb recently armed guards hired from a private security company on board a merchant ship opened fire on a Yemeni fishing vessel assuming it was a pirate craft. These actions contribute to a worsening situation.

 

  1. How many yachts transit the GoA?  In 2009 the Port Captain in Salalah was said to have recorded 128 in September-March 2009 and 70 in the opposite direction, total about 200. The overall total may be more than this.  At UKMTO there had been very few registrations during the last year and ISAF was requested to continue its efforts to make the UKMTO reporting facility known to oceanic cruisers

 

  1. What was the future for the naval operation?  The UN Security Council has extended it until 2012.  The mandate was first to protect ships in the World Food Programme (they carry food for 3m of the 9m population of Somalia) and second to protect other vulnerable shipping.  Noted that 7% of the world’s oil supplies pass through the GoA. 

 

  1. Did EUNAVFOR have a mandate to assist in Yemeni waters (ie up to 12 miles offshore)?  They could, but had first to get permission from the Yemeni Foreign Affairs Department which would take time and could delay a response.

 

  1. What was the strength of the Yemeni navy and coastguard?  MSCHOA did not have this data (at a later meeting held at IMO the Yemeni Deputy Minister for Maritime Affairs and Ports Sector said there were 10 patrol boats of 35m each and 20 vessels of 20m).  The Yemeni forces were not part of the operations coordinated by MSCHOA or NATO.  A number of yachts (see contributions to conference papers) believed that passage along the Yemeni coast was safer and preferable to taking the buffer zone within the IRTC.

 

  1. Some reports suggested that Yemeni patrol escorts could be arranged in return for a fee.

 

  1. At least one rally sticks to the buffer zone of the IRTC whilst others prefer to travel close to the Yemeni coast.

 

  1. Whilst its primary advice remained that yachts should avoid the area because of the high level of danger, for those that insisted on making the passage MSCHOA continued to recommend the IRTC route on the basis that regular naval patrols took place there.  However it was also noted that a pirate tactic is to lie in wait in the IRTC.

 

  1. Was joining the IRTC at some point along its length still a valid procedure if a boat wished to?  Yes.

 

  1. Could EUNAVFOR maintain a permanent watch at Bab el Mandeb?  (noting that this was a “choke point” through which all vessels must pass and stories circulating that increased pirate activity was happening at the south end of the Red Sea).   MSCHOA did not plan for a permanent naval presence at Bab el Mandeb and did not believe that there was significant new activity at this point.

 

  1. How fast would a 406MHz distress alert in the GoA be known to coalition forces?  - quickly, and a UK-registered EPIRB alert from the GoA area would be delivered immediately to the naval forces.

 

  1. Should AIS be “on” during a transit of the GoA?  Yes, the same advice as given to commercial ships in the document BMP3 (Best Management Practice) to help naval forces keep track of legitimate traffic.   However outside the GoA (Indian Ocean, for example) skippers may wish to keep AIS “off” unless needed.  Do pirates use AIS to track targets?  At present, no.

 

  1. Current Guidelines recommend carrying enough fuel for the entire IRTC passage – some yacht would have difficulty with this either for capacity reasons or simply that they could not afford that much fuel.

 

  1. What is the security assessment of the Maldives and the Seychelles?  Currently both are regarded as safe (noting however that the Chandlers were pirated when SW of the Seychelles).  The Seychelles now has a fleet of patrol craft and central radar surveillance.

 

  1. The route for the Volvo Ocean Race in December 2011/ January 2012 would be from Cape Town to Abu Dhabi, then Abu Dhabi to Sanya.  The majority of commercial traffic between the Cape of Good Hope and the Persian Gulf is now routed east of the Maldives.   The VOR Race Committee would keep closely in touch with MSCHOA.

 

  1. How are warnings broadcast of pirate attacks?  As MSI (Maritime Safety Information) via satellite in the SafetyNET system and also –where available- NAVTEX.  Most ocean cruising boats do not carry Std-C satcom terminals and there is no NAVTEX station covering the GoA region (it was hoped that NAVTEX would eventually be installed in Yemen to fill the gap).  Ocean cruising boats often carry HF and many can access email but only by initiating calls which may be done once or twice daily. 

 

  1. (Post-meeting question: could piracy alerts be transmitted to sat phones -Iridium etc- by SMS text? would this be useful to cruisers? – Answer – Yes, from BWR. Virtually all ocean cruisers have email via HF and a large proportion have Iridium phones.)

                        

  1. Should a sailing vessel keep her sails down to reduce her visibility?  No opinion from MSCOA but one rally organizer present considered that for this reason sails should not be used.

 

  1. Was it practical to enforce a cordon sanitaire along the coast of Somalia to prevent pirates going to sea?  No.  The coastline was 2,000 miles long.  Some progress had been made through aerial surveillance and the coalition was seeking more base facilities in the region.  Luxembourg has no ships but is contributing financially to air operations.

 

  1. Having heard a considerable number of reasons why yachts should not enter the Gulf of Aden Alan Green asked whether naval advice was in fact that the Guidelines should only say “do not enter the GoA”, and nothing besides?  That was not the naval position.  The navy position was to stress that the situation was very dangerous but that if after considering the warning a yacht decided to make the passage she should be strongly encouraged to inform the authorities etc. essentially as set out in the current Guidelines.

 

  1. Regarding the Guidelines it was suggested that what is now advice would be better given as information in terms of you can or you may do such-and-such rather than you should do it.

 

  1. The next edition of the Guidelines should be easier to read and include diagrams and illustrations.  Simon C will circulate to attendees a re-usable version of the powerpoint shown at the meeting, from which diagrams and pictures could be copied.  There is no intention to print the Guidelines but rather to make them available as widely as possible on the internet.

 

  1. ISAF will consider how the Guidelines may be brought to the attention of more cruising yachts.  At present the text is available on the web sites of ISAF, EUNAVFOR, Noonsite and the Cruising Association. The flyer was translated into French (at the request of the Djibouti authorities) for display there.

 

  1. A useful contact point is the Oasis Club in Salalah.  The UK Naval Attaché and UKMTO both have good connections there. The main ‘yachties’ agent is Mohammed Saad.

 

  1. Do the navies not have an obligation to their taxpayers to provide protection to all citizens?  The EUNAVFOR web site says:

 

42. “The European Union is conducting a military operation to help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia.

This military operation, named European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation ATALANTA, was launched in support of Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838 and 1846 which were adopted in 2008 by the United Nations Security Council.

Its mandate is to contribute to:
• protect vessels of the World Food Programme, humanitarian aid and African Union Military Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping
•protect vulnerable shipping
•help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery
•monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia

This operation – the European Union’s first naval operation – is being conducted in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)”.

(This quotation is included in the minutes for information but was not quoted in full at the meeting – AG)

  1. MSCHOA Chief of Staff Col Richard Spencer was aware that Tom Sampson (who had contributed papers to the conference) may have further questions and had undertaken to respond directly to a written enquiry from him. 

 

  1. Was yacht transport by ship a viable proposition?  The conference papers included a proposal from the shipping company 7 Star to offer a transportation service.  The cost per yacht was not known nor yet were the proposed ports of embarkation and disembarkation.  ISAF will help 7 Star to advertise the service if they decide to go ahead.  It was appreciated that even on board a ship, yachts were still at some risk although in the view of MSCHOA ships which complied assiduously with BMP3 would have a reduced risk.

 

  1. The Chandlers had been in captivity for 365 days.  Paul and Rachel were well known in the Cruising Association (represented at the meeting by ted Osborn) as extremely competent.  The latest information at CA was that they were reasonably fit but very tired.  It was believed they were being held close to the coast in a known location.  The UK government discourages payment of ransoms.

 

  1. The ISAF position was that through its International Regulations Commission it was pleased to act as a link between organizations such as EUNAVFOR and the oceanic sailing community considering it important that the fullest information should be made available to sailors who should, just as the masters of commercial vessels do, make their own judgement as to how to proceed.

 

  1. On behalf of all yachtsmen and ISAF Alan Green expressed warm appreciation to  EUNAVFOR, MSCHOA, UKMTO, NATO and their associates for their support both ashore and afloat and in particular to Simon Church and the staff at MSCHOA for facilitating the present meeting.

By Alan Green/ISAF 28th October 2010.

 

UPDATE : Read this new article about piracy from Elaine Bunting's blog :

Since it has no proper links with the cruising community - and vice versa - ISAF has raised eyebrows by deciding to issue strong advice to yachtsmen not to enter the Gulf of Aden because of the risks of piracy.

The warning is oddly timed because many hundreds of yachts are currently doing this safely in growing confidence that the zone is becoming safer than it has been for years. Meanwhile, the evidence is that areas of gravest threat are shifting towards Kenya and into the Indian Ocean as far south as the Seychelles and Madagascar.

These are areas that are not patrolled, as is the Gulf of Aden, by the coalition forces of the US Navy's Combined Task Force 151 and the EU's Op ATALANTA.

When I was researching a special feature on piracy in our June issue (out on May 14th, by the way) Peter Seymour, a founder of Blue Water Rallies and its specialist adviser on security and piracy, told me: "My impression is that the incidence of piracy against yachts [in the Gulf of Aden] has fallen dramatically in the last six months."

Peter has safely taken seven round the world rallies through the Gulf of Aden in the last 14 years, including a group of 29 cruisers earlier this year, routeing for maximum protection through the centre buffer zone between the east-west and west-east Internationally Recommended Transit Corridors (IRTC).

That view is supported by other sailors who have cruised through this area. The Vasco da Gama rally also transited the Gulf of Aden without incident this year. Organiser Lo Brust has been through five times and his tactic is to sail within 10 miles of the coast of Oman and Yemen.
It is not just yacht rallies that have been safely transiting. There is a steady flow of independent cruisers. The trend is towards starting from Salalah in Oman and forming groups for safe passage; cruisers hook up at the western-style Oasis Club.

The port captain of Salalah confirms today that in the last three months 144 yachts have left for Aden and the Red Sea. As far as I can determine, there have been no incidents.

Another indicator of the relative risks is that it is possible to get yacht insurance through Lloyds underwriters to go through the Gulf of Aden.

ISAF's sailing instruction style advice bothers me and I hope it's not the first of more directives for cruisers. For while cruising sailors can make their own minds up, there is always a risk that its self-appointed authority could make life difficult in bureaucratic ways.

As I say, the risky areas appear to be shifting into the Indian Ocean, which they mention only in passing. There were four yacht hijackings last month around the Seychelles. It's important to emphasise that these are not random opportunistic thefts by rogue fishermen but well-organised businesses hijacking for ransom.

Statistically, there are much greater danger areas nearer to home. Melodye and John Pompa run the Caribbean Safety and Security Net. They tell me that there were 90 reported attacks in the Eastern Caribbean and Venezuela on yachts in 2008, including six injuries and four deaths. Up to March this year there were 15 reported attacks and one death (that does not include the widely reported murder of superyacht skipper Drew Gollan ashore in Antigua).

Parts of Venezuela are now seriously dangerous and have a dire track record of armed attacks and assaults. But statistics show that attacks are a low-level threat through the Caribbean: there were 110 recorded on yachts in the Southern Windward islands between 2005 and 2008.

When evaluating the actual risks of cruising or passagemaking, I think the key thing is to ensure the information you have is the most up to date possible. I wouldn't look to ISAF for that. Keep in touch with other cruisers as you go, check into the various nets (such as the Caribbean Safety net) and email groups and keep abreast of the excellentcruising website Noonsite.

And if you are interested in finding out more about piracy, the reported statistics and threats in various parts of the world, and advice on security from a panel of cruising experts….did I recommend buying our June issue?

Elaine Buntin (Copyright Yachtingworld 2009)

Article about piracy from Lo Brust, Vasco da Gama Rally :

It's a well know fact of the problem with the Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the extreme South of the Red Sea near the Somalia border In the past 10 years I have sailed this route 5 times. All these times sail no more as max. 10NM out of the Coast from Oman and Yemen, to reach their Coastguard Radio. Every day I saw many fishing boats going offshore in the morning and sail back in the afternoon. I am never disturbed by any of them, they are extremely friendly and several times coming close to my yacht to say hello. But very strict to come never closer as max. 10 meters to my yacht.

During the past 2 rallies I had in Aden meetings with the Yemen Coastguard, Navy and Harbor Master to inform them about the rally and our plans. They alerted all their stations on the Coast. Also in Cooperation with the Dutch Embassy I have informed the International Coalition Fleet. Due the increasing number of attacks this year the United Nations arranged a Combined Joined Task Force Horn of Africa and enlarge the numbers of Navy ships establish a protected corridor from Al Mukalla to the Red Sea. In August Noonsite published an advice from LCDR Brett Morash USN for yachts: to sail in convoy and inform them if you are in the Gulf.
I have informed them about the Vasco da Gama rallies and he send the following mail back:
That sounds good. When you have more details please let me know and I will make sure that we get the word out to our coalition allies to keep an eye out for them. Brett Morash.

Also Yemeni governement now have 3 Pirate Centres planned for the Coast of Yemen ( Al Mukalla, Aden and the Red Sea Port of Hodeidah.

Sailing in Eritrean and Sudanese waters is safe but sometimes yachts will approached by small like fishing boats, with crew with weapons and no uniformed. This are the so called Cost Guard. They will ask you to stop and check your papers. In our experience they have always been courteous and in one occasion they waved us after checking that we were flying an Eritrean Courtesy flag. Of course any yacht sailing in a country's waters without flying a courtesy flag is asking for troubles. Be al ways patient and correct.

Before entering the Gulf on Aden (Salalah or Aden, there will be a meeting with all the captains and crew. These convoy in groups of 5 yachts with a leader receive clear instructions. It's very important for your and other members safety to follow these instructions. For safety reasons these instructions will not be publish on the website.